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eral sovereignty, and Lockean natural rights might even end up 
precise enough to avoid the need to pursue higher levels of gen-
erality, and thus the problem of arbitrariness could be contained. 
When we needed Constitutional change, then, we would not rely 
on the judges' senses of how higher levels of Lockean theory 
would resolve the problem, we could-as Gerber quite wisely 
recommends as a check on the Justices (pp. 139-144)-simply use 
the Article V process, and amend the document. 
But this last is the familiar rant of the reviewer that if he 
were writing the book he would have written a different one.13 
On Gerber's own terms his book ought to be regarded as a suc-
cessful and quite comprehensive proposal for rethinking Consti-
tutional law in general and the selection and operation of 
Supreme Court Justices in particular. It is written with sparkle 
and passion and with a lucidity rare in works about Constitu-
tional hermeneutics. It deserves to be widely read, debated, and 
improved upon by other scholars and by Gerber himself. Indeed, 
To Secure These Rights ought to attract the attention not only of 
scholars of constitutional law, but of those of history, politics, 
and moral philosophy. Perhaps it will even do its part in bringing 
us back the kind of synthesis of those fields that the framers en-
joyed, and without which interpretation faithful to the original 
understanding cannot take place. 
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE. By 
Gerald Gunthef.l New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1994. Pp. 
ix, 818. Cloth, $39.00; Paper, $19.95. 
John WertheimerZ 
Like countless other students, I got my first serious exposure 
to the intricacies of American constitutionalism through the 
pages of Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law, the leading 
casebook in the field. At the time, I thought it strange that, amid 
13. Made more ironic here because I did, and attempted to derive supra-constitu-
tional principles, and apply them to present problems in much the same way that Gerber 
did. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 4). He does a much better 
job than I did, however, at clearly laying out a coherent and widespread understanding of 
his particular brand of extra-constitutional interpretive guides, tackles a wider field of 
contemporary problems, and offers a more expansive set of remedies for containing judi-
cial arbitrariness. (pp. 134-61) 
1. Professor of Constitutional Law, Stanford University. 
2. Assistant Professor of History, Davidson College. 
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the unending parade of precedent-setting Supreme Court opin-
ions (they appear in my memory, furiously underlined and mad-
deningly dense), the book included a First Amendment decision 
that, besides coming from a lowly federal district court, appeared 
to set no precedent whatsoever, for superior tribunals immedi-
ately rejected its speech-protective reasoning. The decision in 
question was Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten;3 its author was a 
federal judge memorably named Learned Hand. 
Today, Professor Gunther's decision to include Masses in his 
casebook seems less mysterious. For one thing, Hand's elegant 
First Amendment reasoning blazed a trail that, though not fol-
lowed at the time, was picked up decades later by the Warren 
Court. For another thing, it happens that Gunther, in 1953-54, 
served as Learned Hand's law clerk. By including Masses in his 
casebook, thus, Gunther was at once mourning a legal path not 
soon enough taken and celebrating the memory of his mentor, 
Learned Hand, one of the greatest judges in American history. 
In Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge, Gunther's masterful 
biography, this celebration continues. 
Gunther's weighty book follows its subject from cradle to 
grave, leaving few stones unturned along the way. It begins in 
1872, the year of Billings Learned Hand's birth to a respectable 
Albany family. At fourteen, young Learned experienced the 
death of his father, a successful appellate lawyer; for the rest of 
his life, Hand would despair of ever approaching his father's pro-
fessional stature-even after he had far surpassed it. Gunther 
traces both Hand's admirable humility and his sometimes para-
lyzing self-doubt to this source. 
Learned Hand attended Harvard College, which affected 
him both personally and intellectually. His exclusion from 
Harvard's elite social clubs reinforced feelings of insecurity. 
(One productive byproduct of this exclusion, Gunther suggests, 
may have been Hand's lifelong opposition to discrimination, in-
cluding that practiced by his alma mater against Jews.) Mean-
while, Harvard's brilliant philosophy faculty, above all George 
Santayana, William James, and Josiah Royce, validated 
Learned's emerging intellectual skepticism and inspired in him a 
spirit of inquiry and open-mindedness that would stay with him 
for the rest of his life. 
So inspired was Learned by his philosophy professors that 
he seriously considered graduate study and a career in that field. 
3. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) 
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His continued lack of confidence, however, left him vulnerable to 
family pressures to abandon his dream and, like his father, grand-
father, and two uncles before him, study law. In his twenty-first 
fall, therefore, Hand turned his back on philosophy and, some-
what grudgingly, entered the Harvard Law School. 
To his surprise, Hand took readily to legal study. As always, 
he excelled in his classes. Less expectedly, he found actual inspi-
ration in the teachings of his best instructors, especially Professor 
James Bradley Thayer, an impressive thinker whose staunch op-
position to judicial activism became a torch that Hand himself 
would carry long after Thayer's death in 1902. 
Graduation from law school in 1896 sent Learned out into 
the world for the first time. He did not fare well. Hand's reflec-
tive nature, so well matched to legal study, was utterly unsuited 
to legal practice. He tried hard to establish himself as a lawyer, 
first in Albany and then in New York City, but so modest was his 
success that it registered in his own mind as failure. Happily, 
Hand found two interests outside his profession to lift his spirits 
during those cheerless years: a growing involvement in the world 
of social reform, and Frances Fincke, a bright, charming, Bryn 
Mawr graduate whom Hand courted and wed. Gunther's sensi-
tive discussion of Learned and Frances's imperfect relationship 
illuminates both the day's conventions and the Hands them-
selves; it adds richly to the book. (Indeed, I felt a real sense of 
loss when Frances slipped almost entirely from view after 
Learned's judicial career took off; Learned, Gunther shows, felt 
this loss more deeply still.) Having thus filled in the background, 
Gunther then sketches Hand as most famously remembered: 
robed in black, imposing brow knit, gavel in hand. Learned first 
struck this pose in 1909, when President William Howard Taft 
appointed him to the federal bench; and in that pose he would 
remain-serving first as a federal district judge and then, after 
1924, as a member of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit-for an impressive fifty unbroken years. Hand's exceptional 
performance won for him every conceivable mark of judicial dis-
tinction save one: elevation to the United States Supreme Court. 
Despite frequent rumors that he was next in line, Hand, for rea-
sons painstakingly detailed by Gunther, never made it to the na-
tion's highest bench. 
In Gunther's extensive discussion of Hand's judicial career, 
four principal themes emerge. First, throughout his time on the 
bench, Hand wrestled with a dilemma faced by all politically en-
gaged judges: how to balance the imperative of judicial impartial-
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ity against the urge to participate actively in public affairs. 
Although never drawn to partisan politics, Hand avidly followed 
public controversies. At times, his passion overcame him and 
swept him into action. This was especially true early in his judi-
cial career, as in 1912, when he became an important adviser to 
Theodore Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" presidential campaign, even 
while occupying a place on the federal bench. Although Hand 
disciplined himself more effectively as he matured, he never fully 
reconciled his native impulse to engage in public controversies 
with his judicial obligation to stay above them. 
Gunther's second theme involves Hand's unswerving com-
mitment to free speech. Having learned from his undergraduate 
philosophy studies to distrust absolutist dogma and to value open 
inquiry, Judge Hand sought throughout his career to expand the 
range of permissible expression as much as possible within the 
confines of existing law. From the aforementioned Masses opin-
ion of 1917, wherein Hand bravely defended the right of leftist 
dissenters during World War I, to his opposition to McCarthyism 
some three-and-a-half decades later, Learned Hand, Gunther 
shows, compiled an impressive record as one of the century's 
true champions of free expression. 
Third, Gunther details Hand's firm commitment to judicial 
restraint. From the Gilded Age through the Great Depression, 
American courts were notorious for striking down popular re-
form statutes on vague Constitutional grounds. Hand utterly op-
posed such interference with the legislative will. Indeed, in five 
decades on the federal bench, he voted only twice to void stat-
utes for constitutional reasons. And it mattered not whose ox 
was being gored. Up through the New Deal, Hand's opposition 
to judicial activism made him a liberal, for the laws most often 
struck down in those years were progressive social reforms such 
as maximum-hour laws for workers.4 Subsequently, however, 
when courts turned their activist powers away from conservative 
goals and toward liberal ones (as happened, most famously, in 
Brown v. Board of Educations), Hand's continued advocacy of 
judicial restraint left him at odds with one of the main currents of 
post-war legal culture and damaged his standing among liberals. 
4. See, most infamously, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a 
New York law banning the employment of bakers for more than 10 hours per day or 60 
hours per week was unconstitutional for violating the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment). Hand wrote a stinging response to the Lochner decision: Due Process of 
Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1908). 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For Hand's doubts regarding Brown, see Learned Hand, 
The Bill of Rights (Harvard U. Press, 1958). 
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Gunther's first three themes, thus, concern Judge Hand's ap-
proach to big issues: the balance between law and politics, the 
limits of free expression, and the legitimacy of judicial review in 
the American constitutional system. Theme number four, in con-
trast, concerns Hand's approach to the sorts of little issues that 
came before his bench daily. Nowhere, Gunther shows, did the 
judge loom larger. Like Mozart and music, Learned Hand, by 
intellect and temperament, was perfectly suited to the art of judg-
ing. His flexible mind sought out all perspectives on an issue 
before settling on a decision. Possessed of an extraordinary ca-
pacity for mastering technical detail, Hand repeatedly untangled 
even the most complex fact situations to lay bare the essential 
legal issues below. In the same manner, his tireless labors ena-
bled him to locate hidden complexities in cases that others 
wrongly saw as open-and-shut. To top it all, Hand was a literary 
craftsman who wrote with clarity and elegance. 
The passages in which Gunther brings Hand's judicial labors 
to life are some of the best in the book. They show Judge Hand 
rolling up his sleeves, spitting on his palms, and wrestling one 
legal conundrum after another to the mat. In one typical pas-
sage, Gunther sketches Hand bent over past tide tables and 
weather reports, drawing diagram after diagram, determined to 
get to the bottom of a disputed ship collision. (p. 307) In an-
other passage, we see Hand sitting alone through a specially 
scheduled theatrical performance, testing with his own eyes alle-
gations of copyright infringement. (p. 319) Little wonder, then, 
that Hand's decisions impressed the U.S. Supreme Court as "the 
best Federal Court opinions that come before us for review." (p. 
272) 
Learned Hand is an impressive book. To prepare it, Gun-
ther cast a research net both broad of reach and fine of weave. 
In this net, he hauled in literally thousands of court opinions; 
tens of thousands of letters, manuscripts, and speeches; and sev-
eral illuminating interviews. One example of Gunther's research 
mastery will suffice: while discussing the college days of Frances 
Fincke, the woman who would later marry Learned Hand, Gun-
ther quotes revealingly from the diary of Mildred Minturn, one 
of Frances's Bryn Mawr housemates. Where did Gunther 
unearth this research gem? Simple: he found it in Fordingbridge, 
Hampshire, England, in the possession of his biographical sub-
ject's wife's college housemate's daughter! (p. 90) 
The extensiveness of Gunther's research enables him to re-
ward his readers steadily with fascinating tidbits. For instance, 
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although most readers will be aware that Theodore Roosevelt's 
1912 presidential campaign bore the intellectual markings of 
Herbert Croly's The Promise of American Life,6 how many know 
that it was Learned Hand who first commended Croly's book to 
TR? How many will know that Hand was a pioneer in the devel-
opment of judicial clerkships? That Felix Frankfurter was mar-
ried (by Benjamin Cardozo, no less) in Hand's chambers? That 
Hand, late in life, developed a warm friendship with the famously 
reclusive J.D. Salinger? Well, it's all true, and Gunther has the 
footnotes to prove it. 
Prodigious research, however, is but one of several strengths 
that Gunther brings to his task. Gunther's own legal expertise is 
another; it makes him a sure-footed guide to the sometimes 
tricky legal and constitutional terrain that Judge Hand himself 
traversed. Furthermore, Gunther's experience as Hand's law 
clerk enables him to escort his readers directly into Hand's cham-
bers. "In writing his memos and opinions," Gunther reports, 
"Hand worked with a legal-size pad of yellow paper, which he 
propped on a board resting on his knees or set on his desk." Oc-
casionally, Hand would lay down his pen and break into song, 
filling his chambers with "old Calvinist hymns, sea chanteys, and 
G[ilbert] & S[ullivan] numbers." (pp. 290, 415) Who but a for-
mer law clerk would know these wonderful details? (Of course, 
intimacy presents dangers as well as advantages to the biogra-
pher. The possibility of bias is always present when people write 
about revered mentors. To Gunther's credit, however, only occa-
sionally-as when he seeks, persuasively though still defensively, 
to blame Hand's opposition to Brown v. Board of Education on 
the unfortunate influence of Felix Frankfurter-does the author 
seem to cover up for his former boss.) 
Finally, Learned Hand excels precisely where one might ex-
pect a book by a law professor about a judge to fail: when dealing 
with non-legal matters. Gunther moves confidently beyond 
Hand's legal career in two directions. First, he zooms outward to 
consider broader issues of twentieth-century history. Because 
Hand was an active correspondent and a close follower of world 
events, Gunther is able to illuminate both the judge and the 
march of twentieth-century history by showing how the former 
wrote about the latter. In this manner, Gunther provides inter-
esting perspectives on issues ranging from the Sacco-Vanzetti 
case and Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing scheme (Hand 
6. Herbert David Croly, The Promise of American Life (Macmillan Co., 1909). 
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was not particularly outraged by either) to birth control and 
American diplomatic internationalism (Hand favored both). 
Besides moving outward beyond Hand's legal career, Gun-
ther moves inward to reveal Learned Hand, the man. He does 
this with a compassionate understanding of what it means to be 
human, enabling him to paint a nuanced, humane portrait of his 
subject. He describes Hand's imposing strengths without making 
him appear invincible, and reveals Hand's less abundant but still 
striking weaknesses without making him seem pitiful. 
The result is the most fully realized biography of this impres-
sive man yet written. Indeed, the fullness and authoritativeness 
of Gerald Gunther's account of the life of Learned Hand might 
never be surpassed. 
No reader will deny that Learned Hand is an admirably 
thorough biography; ungenerous readers, however, might come 
to have mixed feelings about this attribute. All facets of Hand's 
life seem to receive the same meticulous attention. Hand's tem-
porary falling out with his friend Walter Lippmann becomes in 
Gunther's book half a chapter; Hand's failure to be nominated to 
the Supreme Court becomes two chapters. But perhaps a narra-
tive that occasionally runs low on steam is inevitable when a bi-
ographer as conscientious as Gunther writes an 800-page account 
of a subject whose wide paper trail covered nine decades and 
whose professional greatness was as undramatic as was Hand's. 
Perhaps, too, lengthy detail is the unavoidable price of 
authoritativeness. 
Ungenerous readers might also conclude that the historical 
implications of the book are limited. Some other judicial biogra-
phies-Leonard Levy on Chief Justice Shaw comes to mind7-
make strong arguments regarding eras in legal history, arguments 
that easily can inform both classroom teaching and scholarly de-
bate. In contrast, although Gunther's book does contribute ef-
fectively to some historiographical controversies-why Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for instance, converted from opposi-
tion to celebration of free speech, or why Hand and Lippmann 
7. Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw 
(Harvard U. Press, 1957). It should be noted that Levy's biography of Shaw is much less 
comprehensive than Gunther's biography of Hand. Unlike Gunther, for instance, Levy 
focuses almost exclusively on his subject's judicial output, paying but scant attention to 
his life off the bench. Furthermore, even in analyzing Shaw's legal output, Levy makes no 
claims of comprehensiveness, opting, by his own admission, for "depth on a few matters 
rather than breadth of coverage." (5) Nonetheless, or perhaps consequently, Levy's his-
torical arguments have much more bite and are much more broadly resonant than 
Gunther's. 
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experienced their discord-these controversies are not major 
ones. Consequently, Gunther's book works better as a human 
study than as a way of helping us to rethink legal history. 
But if this is a shortcoming-as I am not entirely sure that it 
need be-it is one that suggests the continuing influence of 
Learned Hand on his former clerk. After all, just as Judge Hand, 
in deciding court cases, deferred to precedent, declined to im-
pose his political preferences, and practiced judicial restraint, so 
Professor Gunther, in writing about Hand's life, defers to the his-
torical record, declines to impose his subjective interpretations, 
and practices what might be called biographical restraint. 
Indeed, interpretive temperance is but one among several 
attributes shared by Judge Hand and his biographer. Un-
dogmatic liberalism, attention to detail, even-handedness, 
supreme professionalism, intellectual integrity: it is a tribute to 
Gerald Gunther that these characteristics of Learned Hand, the 
man, also characterize Learned Hand, the book. The judge's life, 
and this fine book, suggest two findings: first, that if our system is 
to work well, it demands the contributions of people who, like 
Learned Hand, work hard, are fair minded, and excel at what 
they do; and second, that the rest of us owe a debt of apprecia-
tion to such people for their contributions, no matter how un-
glamourous. We, the beneficiaries both of Learned Hand's legal 
craftsmanship and of Gerald Gunther's meticulous scholarship, 
owe double. 
